[摘要] 薩特是當(dāng)代法國(guó)著名哲學(xué)家，他的哲學(xué)代表作《存在與虛無》最全面最完整地闡明了他的早期哲學(xué)思想。他曾萌生寫一部倫理學(xué)著作的念頭，并在此后的生涯中陸續(xù)寫下許多倫理學(xué)的筆記。可是到頭來，這部倫理學(xué)著作并未面世。這就引發(fā)了薩特的研究者對(duì)他到底有沒有倫理學(xué)思想和對(duì)倫理學(xué)理論有沒有特殊貢獻(xiàn)的討論。本文援引了西方哲學(xué)界的一些薩特學(xué)者對(duì)這一問題的看法，并發(fā)表了自己的觀點(diǎn)。總的意見是：不能輕言薩特沒有倫理學(xué)，我們可以依據(jù)散見于他的各種著作文章中的倫理學(xué)思想，建構(gòu)起他的倫理學(xué)。本文還對(duì)薩特倫理學(xué)思想的特色作了分析。

[關(guān)鍵詞] 薩特|倫理學(xué)|個(gè)人自由|社會(huì)自由 薩特沒有出版他在《存在與虛無》一書末尾向世人宣告準(zhǔn)備寫的一部倫理學(xué)巨著，這是事實(shí)；可是， 他確實(shí)為寫作這部著作作了大量的準(zhǔn)備工作，寫下了一大摞倫理學(xué)筆記，這也是事實(shí)。兩件事實(shí)擺在一塊兒，我們應(yīng)該得出怎樣的結(jié)論？薩特，歸根結(jié)底，有沒有他獨(dú)特的倫理學(xué)理論？ 在西方哲學(xué)界，薩特的評(píng)論家和批評(píng)者對(duì)這個(gè)問題有著熱烈的爭(zhēng)論。薩特生前，無論成文的倫理學(xué)著作，還是大綱，仰或手稿都未見諸于世，所以爭(zhēng)論集中在如下的問題上：假如薩特有時(shí)間寫倫理學(xué)一書，他有無可能創(chuàng)建成體系的倫理學(xué)？根據(jù)薩特遺留的著作文章中的倫理學(xué)論述，構(gòu)建他的倫理學(xué)有無可能？一些專家認(rèn)為這種構(gòu)建薩特倫理學(xué)的嘗試是不可能的，這種不可能性來自薩特哲學(xué)本身內(nèi)在的矛盾沖突。他們指出，薩特在《存在與虛無》中所持的本體論立場(chǎng)毀掉了他的倫理學(xué)的可能性；另一些學(xué)者則主張，要使薩特的倫理學(xué)有可能重建，必須徹底塵封他的早期思想，將這一倫理學(xué)建立在他的晚期著作的基礎(chǔ)上；還有一些薩特研究者提出，從薩特遺留的著作文章看，薩特倫理學(xué)的大致輪廓還是依稀可辨的，因此有可能通過充實(shí)和細(xì)化，使這一輪廓變得清晰、明朗、豐滿；最后一種觀點(diǎn)則堅(jiān)持，雖然薩特有許多引人入勝的關(guān)于倫理學(xué)的談話、文章和筆記發(fā)表，但是，從總體上說，這些精彩的思想火花和靈感是零碎不全的，全面的分析和最后的歸納依然缺乏，不足以立起一座倫理學(xué)大廈。 以上大相徑庭的觀點(diǎn)可以概括為兩個(gè)問題：第一，我們心目中的薩特倫理學(xué)，是否應(yīng)建立在他在《存在與虛無》中所表述的本體論上？如果是，那么他早期的本體論認(rèn)為人的本性是絕對(duì)自由的，這一觀點(diǎn)同他后來的“人的自由受到社會(huì)條件的制約，因此人不是絕對(duì)自由的”觀點(diǎn)相矛盾。關(guān)鍵的問題在于薩特后期保留還是放棄了他早期的本體論。如果薩特直到去世仍然抱著他的早期本體論觀點(diǎn)舍不得放下，他的新倫理學(xué)就不可能誕生，否則，我們就得去探索作為他的新倫理學(xué)基礎(chǔ)的新本體論。而薩特遺留的文稿表明，他并沒有創(chuàng)立新的本體論。第二，根據(jù)散見于薩特所有的文章著作中的倫理學(xué)論述，能否足以形成薩特倫理學(xué)的理論體系？或者是，即使薩特有一些倫理學(xué)觀點(diǎn)，它們也是零碎不全的，因此，系統(tǒng)的薩特倫理學(xué)是無法想象和建構(gòu)起來的。 許多薩特的批評(píng)者認(rèn)為薩特早期在《存在與虛無》中提出的本體論，阻礙了他形成有生命力的倫理學(xué)。只有徹底背棄這個(gè)本體論，擁抱另一個(gè)本體論，才能為他的倫理學(xué)奠定一個(gè)堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)。由于我們沒有見到薩特另一個(gè)系統(tǒng)的本體論，所以這使得薩特的倫理學(xué)不可能。 瑪麗.沃呶克（MaryWarnock）、華特.歐岱尼克 (Walter Odajnyk) 和威爾福瑞德.迪僧 (Wilfrid Desan) 就是持這種觀點(diǎn)的代表人物。然而，另一些人不同意這種觀點(diǎn)。托馬斯.安德生（Thomas C. Anderson）說：那些否定薩特本體論的批評(píng)者“有著對(duì)薩特本體論的誤解”。他相信，“一旦薩特的本體論被正確地理解，雖然不是全部，但是許多困難能被解決…總而言之，更準(zhǔn)確地說，作為薩特倫理學(xué)的真正基礎(chǔ)，薩特早期的本體論對(duì)于他的倫理學(xué)的發(fā)展，不是一個(gè)很大的障礙。”安德生承認(rèn)在出版《存在與虛無》之后的三十年內(nèi)，薩特在許多方面修正了他的早期倫理學(xué)。然而，他沒有指明“在那個(gè)時(shí)期，薩特的倫理觀點(diǎn)有哪些本質(zhì)變化。”薩特主要在20世紀(jì)40年代的著作中建立起來的倫理學(xué)“之大部仍然建立在他的早期本體論上”。 [1] 托馬斯.布齊 (Thomas W. Busch) 說，在《薩特實(shí)錄》電影中，米雪.康泰特（Michel Contat）問薩特有否審視過他大約三十卷著作，從中找出貫通這些著作的主線。薩特回答：是有一根主線，雖然他從未刻意去尋找，“哲學(xué)”就是絕無僅有的貫通所有不同著作的連接線。布齊說：“按照對(duì)‘哲學(xué)’的理解，自由應(yīng)是貫通薩特全部著作的概念。” [2] 雖然在自由的問題上，薩特承認(rèn)他的觀點(diǎn)有很大的變化，他的話表明他仍然視他早期的自由理論為他的哲學(xué)思想，包括倫理學(xué)的核心思想，這一思想也貫穿他的晚期著作中的倫理學(xué)思想。同安德生一樣，布齊也聲稱薩特早期哲學(xué)常常被誤解：“薩特哲學(xué)，從一開始就被誤解， 在《存在與虛無》出版四十五年后，它仍然被誤解。”[3] 大衛(wèi).代特默 (David Detmer) 也認(rèn)為薩特早期思想一直是，并且仍然是，許多方面被錯(cuò)誤地解讀。他堅(jiān)定地相信“薩特的倫理學(xué)理論能夠被發(fā)掘”，這一工作十分困難，因?yàn)樗斜匾皬纳⒙湓谒_特全部著作中的有關(guān)倫理學(xué)的言論再造薩特的倫理學(xué)”。[4] 其他薩特學(xué)者，如琳達(dá).貝爾（Linda A. Bell）和詹姆士.謝里丹(James F. Sheridan) 也著書立說為薩特早期哲學(xué)著作辯護(hù)。 我的研究表明薩特早期的自由觀后來在許多方面被修正，舉例說，他意識(shí)到人的自由與社會(huì)歷史相聯(lián)系，而社會(huì)歷史條件往往與個(gè)人的自由相抵觸。在二戰(zhàn)期間，他經(jīng)歷了參加反納粹，面臨死亡威脅的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，這種強(qiáng)加在他身上的責(zé)任不是他自由的選擇。換言之，他承認(rèn)在許多情況下，人是不自由的。 但因此認(rèn)為薩特從那時(shí)起就拋棄了他早年的自由觀是錯(cuò)誤的，相反，在某種意義上他仍然堅(jiān)持個(gè)人總是自由的的觀點(diǎn)。在一次與西蒙.波伏瓦的談話中，他明確表示：“我從未拋棄自由的觀點(diǎn)，相反，我每一次行動(dòng)，都感到自己是自由的。”[5] 這樣，他一方面承認(rèn)個(gè)人自由是有限度的；另一方面仍然保持個(gè)人總是有選擇的自由的觀點(diǎn)，甚至在做囚犯和死亡時(shí)也是這樣。用他的話說：“如果明天這種或那種東西威脅到或阻礙到我的自由，死亡就成為保持我的自由的一種方法。”[6] 很明顯，薩特在不同場(chǎng)合下講的話之間存在著矛盾，這反映出他思想中的矛盾。然而，薩特從未徹底地批判或拋棄他的早期著作《存在與虛無》中的觀點(diǎn)。他確實(shí)在實(shí)現(xiàn)了根本轉(zhuǎn)變后批判了該書中的一些觀點(diǎn)。但是，在他的晚年，他對(duì)早期著作《存在與虛無》和晚期著作《辯證理性批判》作比較時(shí)，并沒有褒“后”貶“前”，在一次訪談中，波伏瓦問他是否認(rèn)為《辯證理性批判》超越《存在與虛無》時(shí)，薩特回答：“我認(rèn)為是如此，但我不應(yīng)該情愿地這樣說，因?yàn)閺哪撤N意義上說，我的早期著作在寫作時(shí)就打上了滿意的記號(hào)。對(duì)我來說認(rèn)為《辯證理形批判真的高于《存在與虛無》是非常困難的。”為什么？因?yàn)椤皬哪撤N意義上說，過去比未來更重要，它給了我們某樣?xùn)|西。”[7] 這兒薩特給了我們一個(gè)暗示，他并不認(rèn)為早期哲學(xué)著作《存在與虛無》中的本體論思想，對(duì)形成和發(fā)展他的倫理學(xué)理論是一個(gè)不可逾越的障礙。 這就說明，“如果薩特沒有丟棄他早期的本體論，就不會(huì)有薩特倫理學(xué)”的觀點(diǎn)，是不是個(gè)合乎邏輯的推論？我承認(rèn)，因?yàn)樗_特沒有找到一個(gè)令人滿意的解決之道調(diào)和他的個(gè)人絕對(duì)自由和團(tuán)體自由以及社會(huì)自由之間的矛盾，他對(duì)有生之年發(fā)表他的倫理學(xué)專著猶豫不決，但是，從他的許多作品，我們能夠窺見他對(duì)倫理學(xué)思考的端倪和想要完成這本著作的心愿，因此我們有可能沿著他思想的路徑，撿起他撒落的花瓣，走完他走到半途的路程。 對(duì)于第二個(gè)問題，根據(jù)薩特所有文章著作中涉及的倫理學(xué)觀點(diǎn)，我們能否將它們歸納綜合，形成系統(tǒng)的薩特倫理學(xué)，我的回答是既可能又有相當(dāng)?shù)碾y度。說“可能”是因?yàn)椴豢煞裾J(rèn)地，薩特留下了數(shù)量可觀的關(guān)于倫理學(xué)的論述。戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)日記（1939-1940）、存在與虛無（1943）、反猶太人和猶太教（1946）、存在主義是人道主義（1946）、唯物主義和革命（1946）、倫理學(xué)筆記（1947-1948）、方法論研究（1954）、辯證理性批判（1960）、倫理學(xué)筆記（1964-1965）就是其中的一些代表作。這些著作蘊(yùn)含著豐富的對(duì)倫理學(xué)問題的思考，如個(gè)人自由問題、個(gè)人自由和社會(huì)自由的關(guān)系、自由與價(jià)值的關(guān)系、自由與選擇、選擇與責(zé)任、好信仰和壞信仰、 倫理與行動(dòng)、武力與暴力、自在與自為等等問題。面對(duì)這么多有價(jià)值的思想材料，我們不能視而不見，武斷地說復(fù)原薩特倫理學(xué)是不可能的事。 雖然薩特沒有寫出系統(tǒng)的倫理學(xué)著作，甚至沒有提供一個(gè)倫理學(xué)著作的綱要，他的一些倫理學(xué)筆記是在他逝世后才出版的，但是我們能夠從散布在他的著作、文章、筆記、訪談、日記、小說、戲劇、自傳中收攏他有關(guān)倫理學(xué)的思想和見解，加以研究，探索這些思想中的內(nèi)在邏輯，從而思考構(gòu)建系統(tǒng)化的薩特倫理學(xué)的可能性。特別要指出的是，這種研究方法是薩特本人生前極力推崇的：“在我死后出版我的著作，我的論述將保持未完成和抽象狀態(tài)，因?yàn)橹髦械挠^點(diǎn)是未經(jīng)充分發(fā)展的。這些不成熟的觀點(diǎn)將由讀者決定向什么方向發(fā)展。”[8] 然而我們必須同時(shí)對(duì)薩特倫理學(xué)可能性的困難有充分的認(rèn)識(shí)， 最強(qiáng)硬的理由是薩特最終沒有留給我們一部完整的或是部分完成的倫理學(xué)著作。他在有生之年曾經(jīng)幾度想要付諸行動(dòng)，但是每一次不是推延就是擱置這個(gè)寫作計(jì)劃，我們必須正視這一事實(shí)。為此，我相信我們最終無法想象這部倫理學(xué)的模樣。我在另一篇文章中說過，薩特在創(chuàng)建倫理學(xué)時(shí)遭逢一些理論困難，如個(gè)人自由和社會(huì)主義的之間的矛盾沖突，這使他駐足不前。這些未解決的理論問題對(duì)我們尋求構(gòu)建薩特倫理學(xué)的目標(biāo)來說，也是一個(gè)障礙，因?yàn)槲覀儾恢浪_特到底想怎樣解決這些難題。還有，我們迄今所能查閱到的薩特關(guān)于倫理學(xué)的全部資料，仍然是殘缺不全的：他在1945年至1949年間寫下的許多倫理學(xué)筆記已經(jīng)遺失，他在1964年至1965年間寫的倫理學(xué)筆記沒有出版。根據(jù)鮑勃.斯通和伊麗莎白.伯曼的考證：薩特有一千多頁為到羅馬和美國(guó)演講寫下的倫理學(xué)手稿，這些手稿仍未出版。這些材料對(duì)于研究薩特倫理學(xué)無疑是不可或缺的，因?yàn)樗赡苷凵涑鏊_特晚年倫理學(xué)思想的狀態(tài)。正如薩特四十年代倫理學(xué)筆記從法文到英文的翻譯者大衛(wèi).派洛爾（David Pellauer）所說：“任何冒險(xiǎn)要呈上薩特倫理學(xué)的人必須接受犯錯(cuò)的可能性，至少在我們擁有所知道的相關(guān)材料以及其它不知道的文稿問世之前。”[9] 我們已經(jīng)看到，薩特從未徹底拋棄他在早期著作中提出的人的自由的理論，但是他的確想從他的絕對(duì)個(gè)人自由的理論轉(zhuǎn)到社會(huì)自由人的理論。他寫下了許多新倫理學(xué)的文字材料，但是很不幸，我們無法看到這些材料之全部。 這就是研究薩特倫理學(xué)思想的學(xué)者所面對(duì)的現(xiàn)狀。 根據(jù)這一狀況，研究和再現(xiàn)薩特倫理學(xué)應(yīng)當(dāng)首先審度他的本體論，以便發(fā)現(xiàn)他的倫理學(xué)立足的基礎(chǔ)。這就是，自由的理論，它是薩特倫理學(xué)的基石和主線；其次，探尋他在不同地方所涉及到的倫理學(xué)的重要觀點(diǎn)，以便發(fā)現(xiàn)他的倫理學(xué)的重要思想和獨(dú)特觀點(diǎn)；再有，注重薩特“根本轉(zhuǎn)變”后的倫理學(xué)思想，因?yàn)槟鞘撬_特真正想要闡述的他的新倫理學(xué)思想。 根據(jù)我對(duì)薩特著作文章所論及的倫理學(xué)思想的研究，我認(rèn)為在薩特的腦海里，是有一個(gè)倫理學(xué)理論體系的考慮，這個(gè)體系可以包含幾方面的問題：一是闡明自由如何是人的一切行動(dòng)的基本條件。二是價(jià)值問題。論述價(jià)值和自由、價(jià)值和選擇、以及選擇和責(zé)任的關(guān)系。三是道德的理想境界是“真”的問題。其中有對(duì)“壞信仰”和“好信仰”的表現(xiàn)形式、要害實(shí)質(zhì)的分析、達(dá)到“真”的境界和充分運(yùn)用自由的關(guān)聯(lián)。四是人際關(guān)系問題。如何從人與人之間原始的利害沖突的關(guān)系達(dá)到互助互利的關(guān)系。五是闡明自由是人類追求的最高價(jià)值和最終目標(biāo)。這里有如何消滅自由的異化、如何實(shí)現(xiàn)人類的解放、實(shí)現(xiàn)人類解放所運(yùn)用的暴力手段與道德的關(guān)系等等問題。由于篇幅限制，恕我在此無法詳細(xì)展開。 在對(duì)薩特倫理學(xué)思想作了探索之后，我們能夠?qū)w根到底薩特有沒有倫理學(xué)做出回答了。薩特確實(shí)留下許多有重要意義的和有獨(dú)創(chuàng)性的倫理學(xué)的思想，這些思想是對(duì)倫理學(xué)的重要貢獻(xiàn)。雖然他沒有完成系統(tǒng)的倫理學(xué)著作，我們不能無視他的理論創(chuàng)造，武斷地說沒有薩特倫理學(xué)這回事。 以我之見，薩特倫理學(xué)最重要的觀點(diǎn)、特點(diǎn)和貢獻(xiàn)可以概括為以下幾點(diǎn)： 人的自由理論是薩特倫理學(xué)全部理論的主線。薩特從本體論上揭示了人為什么和在本性上是自由的，以及怎樣將自由作為人生最終奮斗目標(biāo)。這是因?yàn)閺谋倔w論上說，人是自為的，即人的本性是有意識(shí)，所以人是虛無，不像萬事萬物，它們是自在的，即它們是存在，對(duì)于它們，我們能夠說出它們是存在的和它們是什么。由于人是意識(shí)，意識(shí)不同于具體存在物，不是存在，他就不得不不斷地制定奮斗目標(biāo)和為實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)的具體方法步驟，從而超越自身，達(dá)到自在自為。在實(shí)現(xiàn)自在自為的過程中，人不得不面臨許多選擇。他自由地在眾多選擇中選出其中之一。一旦他做出選擇，他就要對(duì)自己所作的選擇負(fù)責(zé)。價(jià)值和倫理道德就在人的選擇過程中產(chǎn)生。無論他選擇什么，不僅在這過程中產(chǎn)生道德和價(jià)值，而且直接同人的最終目標(biāo)相聯(lián)，這一最終目標(biāo)就是達(dá)到最大限度的自由。人的一切活動(dòng)體現(xiàn)著自由并且為了自由。自由是薩特倫理學(xué)的核心和靈魂。 薩特另一重要的倫理學(xué)觀點(diǎn)是強(qiáng)調(diào)倫理道德規(guī)范是人創(chuàng)而不是神創(chuàng)。薩特摒棄了道德準(zhǔn)則和人性是先驗(yàn)的、人的行為是上帝的決定的傳統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)，大聲疾呼，世上不存在先驗(yàn)的倫理道德，也不存在先天的人性和掌控人的行為的上帝。他挑戰(zhàn)這樣一個(gè)西方宗教倫理學(xué)的觀點(diǎn)：“如果上帝死了，做任何事都將是允許的。”這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為上帝給了人類道德準(zhǔn)則和行為規(guī)范。他響亮地宣布：上帝沒有頒布任何道德準(zhǔn)則，是人類自己，創(chuàng)造了倫理道德。人自己決定他應(yīng)該做什么，怎樣做才是有價(jià)值，有意義的，因而是人創(chuàng)立了道德規(guī)范。雖然薩特的這一觀點(diǎn)是大膽和叛逆的，但涉及到的倫理理論，仍引起許多爭(zhēng)議，爭(zhēng)議集中在薩特關(guān)于價(jià)值和自由、價(jià)值和選擇的關(guān)系上，根據(jù)薩特所說，價(jià)值是人自由地選擇的產(chǎn)物，比如如果人的每一次選擇是有價(jià)值的和道德的，那末如何解釋對(duì)謀殺的選擇？毫無疑問沒有人認(rèn)為謀殺是正義的、有道德的。除此之外，如果每一個(gè)選擇都是正確的，那將不可能使所選擇的一件事比另一件事更有價(jià)值從而作更好的選擇。 再有，如果所有的選擇都是道德的，那就不會(huì)有不道德之事。但如果沒有不道德之事，那末倫理學(xué)的必要性何在？再有，如果所有的價(jià)值都是從選擇中產(chǎn)生的，我們?nèi)绾侮U明不是從選擇中產(chǎn)生、而是人存在的基本模式、是人具有的選擇可能性的前提的“自由”，具有最高的價(jià)值？ 這些問題對(duì)評(píng)論薩特關(guān)于價(jià)值判斷的觀點(diǎn)是十分關(guān)鍵的。如果他不能給出合理的回答，他的自由和價(jià)值的理論就站不住腳。我沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)薩特對(duì)這些評(píng)論的答復(fù)，這也許因?yàn)樗跇?gòu)建倫理學(xué)的框架是沒有想到這些問題，也許他相信自己能回答這些問題，但要等到在他要撰寫結(jié)果落空的倫理學(xué)著作中回答，也許他覺得無法給與滿意的答復(fù)，既然從未心甘情愿放棄他早期對(duì)自由的看法，因而選擇留待后人去解決這一難題。所以，這兒我們發(fā)現(xiàn)對(duì)進(jìn)一步探究薩特倫理學(xué)至關(guān)重要的觀點(diǎn)：或者必須找到走出這些理論困境的出路，或者必須另辟蹊徑，修正薩特的自由理論，這樣，原有的理論難題將獲得解決，或至少能滿意地給予回答。 薩特另一重要的對(duì)倫理學(xué)的理論貢獻(xiàn)是他提出了“壞信仰”的問題，如常見的說謊行為，這是倫理學(xué)探討的問題之一。 但是薩特所探討的是一個(gè)不同的問題：不是對(duì)他人說假話的問題，而是自我欺騙的問題。薩特對(duì)“壞信仰”問題有深入的研究，他揭示了“壞信仰”的本質(zhì)是為達(dá)到個(gè)人的某種目的，對(duì)他人隱藏自己的真實(shí)性。處在“壞信仰”之下的人，將自己置身于虛幻的想象之中，并且把這種幻想當(dāng)成現(xiàn)實(shí)。 雖然他清楚地知道真實(shí)的現(xiàn)實(shí)是怎樣的，但是他不愿意承認(rèn)和回到現(xiàn)實(shí)中來，寧可將自己的身心沉浸于幻想之中。薩特向我們說明，“壞信仰”在社會(huì)生活中是非常普遍的現(xiàn)象，它侵害了人的自由。“壞信仰”的存在，使人的自由被異化和受損害。薩特進(jìn)一步指出，消除“壞信仰”是可能的，人們能通過追求“好信仰”的途徑來杜絕“壞信仰”的產(chǎn)生。什么是“好信仰”？就是達(dá)到“真”，所謂“真”，就是以真實(shí)的、誠(chéng)實(shí)的、可信的面貌對(duì)人對(duì)事，剝除任何偽裝。薩特指出，有兩條途徑可以通向“真”的境界：一條是清晰地思考，另一條是富有責(zé)任心。這兩條途徑都要求我們待人處世，要坦然地、勇敢地面對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)，不要做“鴕鳥”，逃避現(xiàn)實(shí)，要勇于承擔(dān)各種后果。有人會(huì)說，這些方法也許仍然太籠統(tǒng)，但至少向我們提供了一些原則。雖然我們能夠抓住一些薩特對(duì)如何達(dá)到“真”的理解的話語和如何對(duì)“壞信仰”進(jìn)行干預(yù)的具體方法，比如永遠(yuǎn)站在被壓迫人民一邊，但是總的來說，薩特沒有詳細(xì)闡明怎樣運(yùn)用這些原則。 薩特在倫理學(xué)方面有兩項(xiàng)重大轉(zhuǎn)變是值得一提的。一是他認(rèn)識(shí)到人是社會(huì)的存在物，所以對(duì)人的自由的研究必須將其放進(jìn)一定的社會(huì)和歷史的環(huán)境之中方能進(jìn)行，由此他將先前認(rèn)為人是孤獨(dú)無靠的、脫離社會(huì)群體和社會(huì)歷史條件的觀點(diǎn)和研究方法拋到九霄云外去了。當(dāng)薩特認(rèn)識(shí)到他以前犯的錯(cuò)誤后，進(jìn)而發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)一個(gè)社會(huì)存在壓迫、貧窮和階級(jí)斗爭(zhēng)的情況下，人的自由被嚴(yán)重地?fù)p害和異化，因此認(rèn)識(shí)到，為了恢復(fù)個(gè)人自由，被壓迫者必須首先聯(lián)合起來，用階級(jí)的力量去實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)的自由，個(gè)人自由只有在全體被壓迫階級(jí)被解放之后才能重新獲得。 在第二次世界大戰(zhàn)前，薩特提出糾正“壞信仰”的方法是個(gè)人的“自我防御”。他相信個(gè)人能夠通過倫理道德的修身養(yǎng)性達(dá)到“真”的境界。然而二戰(zhàn)后，他徹底放棄了這種通過所謂“個(gè)人靈魂拯救”來實(shí)現(xiàn)個(gè)人絕對(duì)自由的方法，轉(zhuǎn)而接受個(gè)人自由的真正實(shí)現(xiàn)取決于社會(huì)全體人的自由實(shí)現(xiàn)的觀點(diǎn)。 另一重要轉(zhuǎn)變是他的主觀際的理論。薩特早年想象人與人之間的關(guān)系在本質(zhì)上總是沖突的，這是因?yàn)橐环娇傄沽硪环綄?duì)象化，即從本體論上分析，每個(gè)人在與他人相處時(shí)，總會(huì)自覺或不自覺地視自己為主體，視對(duì)方為客體，反映在人際關(guān)系上，就是“他人是地獄”。在薩特眼里，人際關(guān)系是一幅冷酷和悲情的畫面。然而，當(dāng)薩特意識(shí)到人其實(shí)是社會(huì)性的存在物之后，他在人際關(guān)系中看到了互惠。之所以得出這個(gè)結(jié)論，是運(yùn)用了一種新的思維方法，即把處在社會(huì)團(tuán)體中的每個(gè)人都看成是“第三方”。在這種方法論指導(dǎo)下，每個(gè)人都發(fā)現(xiàn)自己是與他人相同的“同類”：既能是主體，又能是客體，還能是主體、客體之外的第三方。這是因?yàn)椋鳛榈谌剑雌渌丝梢允侵黧w也可以是客體。這樣，人與人之間就沒有區(qū)別，是平等的，沒有人只是主子不是奴隸，也沒有人只是奴隸不是主子。他由此得出結(jié)論，每個(gè)人在維護(hù)個(gè)人自由之外，都必須同時(shí)承認(rèn)他人的自由。薩特在他的著名論著《辯證理性批判》中，深入地研究了團(tuán)體自由、階級(jí)自由和國(guó)家自由的問題。他對(duì)倫理學(xué)中的共同自由研究的成果是：個(gè)人自由必須植根于社會(huì)全體人自由的土壤之中才能根深葉茂。只有當(dāng)社會(huì)共同自由提升到較高水平，個(gè)人自由才能隨之得到升華。但是他的研究也有消極的成果。 薩特同時(shí)又認(rèn)為，似乎共同自由發(fā)展的程度越高，對(duì)個(gè)人自由的限制也越多，就是說，共同自由的提升，會(huì)導(dǎo)致個(gè)人自由的下降。所以，一方面，離開共同自由，個(gè)人自由將無法生存；另一方面，從某種意義上說，個(gè)人自由與共同自由相矛盾、相抵牾。這是晚年薩特面臨的理論上的困境。薩特一方面仍然不放棄早期的個(gè)人主義自由觀，另方面他意識(shí)到共同自由的社會(huì)自由與個(gè)人自由同等重要。他必須找到一條整合這兩種不同的自由的方法，然而薩特似乎沒有能夠圓滿地解開這道難題。這就是為什么他在有生之年躊躇未完成和發(fā)表它的倫理學(xué)著作的原因。 我們?cè)谶z憾薩特沒有寫出他的倫理學(xué)著作之余，也要想想薩特說過的話：著作的未完成，是留給讀者更廣闊的空間去思考作者會(huì)怎樣寫下去或會(huì)寫出什么來，這是件好事。就目前薩特倫理學(xué)的研究狀況，根據(jù)他完成的著作中所表述過的觀點(diǎn)去嘗試構(gòu)建薩特的倫理學(xué)，是我們肩負(fù)的使命。

Is There a Sartrean Ethics?

It is a fact that Sartre did not publish his work of ethics， which he made an announcement at the very end of his philosophical work Being and Nothingness. It is also a fact， however， Sartre had prepared a pile of notebooks for this ethics. Combining these two facts together， what conclusion should we make? Sartre， in the final analysis， is there his unique and creative ethical theory? There have been many heated debates on this question among commentators and critics of Sartre’s works throughout the world. Neither an ethics nor even a draft or an outline of such an ethics appeared in print during his lifetime. Hence much of these debates focused on questions such as: Is a Sartrean ethics possible， assuming he had time to write it? Is it possible to formulate his ethics from the works he has left us? Some scholars have maintained that such a project was inherently impossible because of internal difficulties within Sartre’s philosophy. They have claimed that the ontological positions of Being and Nothingness undermine its possibility. Others have held that a Sartrean ethics is possible， but only if one abandons his earlier position and bases this ethics on his later works. Still others have indicated the general outlines of an ethics that are discernible in Sartre’s works， arguing that these can be filled in in detail. A final position is that even though Sartre does have many interesting discussions， essays， and notes that relate to ethics， any overall synthesis is lacking and in the final analysis， unattainable. The above different opining can be reduced to two questions: First， is Sartre’s ethics， which we believe there is one， based on his ontology set forth in Being and Nothingness? If it is， his earlier ontological views maintain that human beings are absolutely free in nature. It would contradicts his later ethical view that human beings are not absolutely free， for his freedom is restricted by the society. The crucial point here is that whether Sartre had been kept or abandoned his earlier ontology in his later life. If Sartre had maintained his earlier ontology till the end of his life， his neo-ethics would not have possibly come into being. Otherwise， we have to find a new ontology for the foundation of this neo-ethics. Secondly， Are Sartre’s ethical points， supposedly there are， can be formed a sketch of Sartrean ethics， from all the literatures of Sartre? Or， even through Sartre did have some ethical points of view， they are mere bits and pieces. In general a systematic ethics is not imaginable and formable. Many of his critics have held that his early ontology as developed in Being and Nothingness prevented him from proposing a viable ethics that it is only by repudiating this ontology and embracing another that he could find a proper foundation for morality. Since Sartre does not have another ontological work， this opinion leads to the conclusion that Sartre’s ethics is impossible. Mary Warnock， Walter Odajnyk， and Wilfrid Desan are representatives of this position. However， many others have disagreed with such a view. Thomas C. Anderson declares that those critics who deny Sartre’s ontology are “rooted in misunderstandings of Sartre’s ontology.” He believes that “once the ontology is understood correctly， many， though not all， of these difficulties can be resolved…. It is more accurate to say that on balance Sartre’s early ontology is not so much an obstacle to the development of his ethics as it is its very foundation.” Anderson concedes that it is true that Sartre modified his early ontology in a number of areas in the thirty years after the publication of Being and Nothingness. However， he has not given any indication that “his moral positions have changed in essentials over that period.” The ethical theory， which was set forth primarily in works written in the 1940s， “remains for most part founded on the early ontology.”[1] Thomas W. Busch reports that in the film Sartre by Himself， Michel Contat asked Sartre if he ever looked back upon the approximately thirty volumes of his works in order to seize what unifying thread there is throughout them. Sartre replied that there was one even though he had never tried to look for it. “Philosophy” would be the only unity there among all the different books. Busch concludes: “In terms of philosophy it would appear that for Sartre freedom would be the obvious unifying concept.”[2] Although on that subject Sartre admitted that he had made considerable changes， his remarks prove that he still regarded his early theory as a part of the whole unifying thread that runs through his later works. Busch， like Anderson， also claims that Sartre’s early philosophy has often been misinterpreted: “Sartre’s philosophy has been， from the beginning， much misunderstood. Forth-five years after its publication Being and Nothingness is still misread.”[3] David Detmer also maintains that Sartre’s early thought has been， and still is， interpreted with many errors. He firmly holds “that a Sartrean ethical theory can be found.” Although the task is difficult， since “it becomes necessary to reconstruct Sartre’s theory from partial discussions which are scattered throughout his writing.” [4]Other scholars of Sartre， such as Linda A. Bell and James F. Sheridan have also published books that defend Sartre’s early philosophical works. My own research tells me that Sartre’s early view of freedom was modified in many ways in his later life. For example， he recognized that one’s freedom was related to the exterior world and history， which set them over against this freedom. During the war， he experienced that the obligation to go fight the Nazis and take part in a life and death struggle was something imposed upon him that he had not truly and freely desired nor chosen. In other words， he admitted that there were many circumstances in which one was not free. But it is wrong to think that Sartre had abandoned his early idea of inpidual freedom from then on. On the contrary， he still insisted in some way on the view that an inpidual is always free. He clearly stated in his interview with Simone de Beauvoir: “I never abandoned the idea of freedom. On the contrary， every time I acted I felt free.” [5]Thus， on the one hand， he acknowledged that there were some limitations on an inpidual’s freedom. On the other hand， he still retained the idea that one is always free to choose， even to remain a prisoner or to die. He says， “If tomorrow some threat or other menaces my freedom， death is a way of preserving it.” [6] Obviously there are some contradictions to be found in Sartre’s different remarks， which reflect a conflict in his thoughts. However， neither did Sartre ever completely repudiate or abandon his early philosophical work， Being and Nothingness. He did criticize the view presented in this work after his radical conversion following World War II. Nevertheless， he made the following comment in comparing Being and Nothingness and his later work， the Critique of Dialectical Reason， in his later years. In his interview with Beauvoir， she asked if he thought the Critique was better than Being and Nothingness. He replied: “I think that’s true， but I shouldn’t say so very willingly because in a way my earlier books are marked by the gratification I had when I was writing them. It’s very hard for me really to think of the Critique of Dialectical Reason as superior to Being and Nothingness.” Why? Because “in a way the past is more important than the future; it brings us something.”[7] Here Sartre provides us a hint that he thought that his early philosophical works， especially Being and Nothingness， are not an obstacle for developing his ethics at all. Is it a logical argument that if Sartre did not abandon his earlier ontology， there would not have been Sartean ethics? Not really. I admit that because Sartre was not able to find a satisfactory way to reconcile his inpidual absolute freedom with group freedom and social liberty， he hesitated to bring about his work of ethics in his lifetime. But obviously， from many of his writings， we can see his thinking on this issue and his attempt to solve the problem. We can go after his thoughts， study what he had achieved to retrieve an ethics as his one in the middle way. Towards the second question， my answer is both “yes” and “no”. The reason I give a positive answer is that it is an undeniable fact that Sartre handed down a considerable quantity of writing on ethics. The War Diaries (1939-1940)， Being and Nothingness (1943)， Anti-Semite and Jew (1946)， “Existentialism is a Humanism”(1946)， “Materialism and Revolution” (1946)， Notebooks for an Ethics (1947-1948)， Search for a Method (1954)， Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960)， and “Notes on Ethics” (1964-1965) are representative examples. These works contain rich and detailed discussions of topics having to do with ethics， such as inpidual freedom， personal freedom and social liberty， freedom and value， life and choice， choice and responsibility， authenticity and bad faith， the importance of actions to ethics， force and violence， to be in-itself-for-itself， etc. Confronted with so many valuable materials， we cannot simply assert that Sartre’s ethics is impossible. Although Sartre failed to finish and publish a systematic work of ethics， and he did not even offer an outline of his ethics during his lifetime， his notebooks scattered in his works， essays， notebooks， interviews， diaries， novels， drama， and biographies， which relate to his ideas regarding ethics. Gather them， study them， and seek to find an internal logic， from which consider the possibilities of a systematic ethics of Sartre. This method was highly recommended by Sartre himself: “Published after my death， these texts will remain unfinished and obscure， since they formulate ideas which are not completely developed. It will be up to the reader to decide where they might have led me.”[8] Yet we must also pass a negative judgment on the possibility of Sartre’s ethics. The reason I also give a negative answer is that ultimately Sartre himself did not provide us with a work of ethics. He intended to write it up several times in his lifetime， but he postponed it or gave it up every time. We have to take this fact seriously. Because of it， I believe， finally we are unable to conceive what this ethics would be. As I said in another article: Sartre had difficulties in resolving certain theoretical problems in his ethics， such as the relation between socialism and liberty， which stopped him from completing it. These unsolved problems are also an obstacle for us if we seek to complete and develop Sartre’s ethics， since we have no idea what Sartre himself might have suggested as a solution. We must add that， for all the material we have， these sources of Sartre’s writings on ethics are also very limited. Many of the notebooks he wrote between 1945 and 1949 have disappeared， and his notes on ethics written in 1964-1965 are still unpublished. According to Bob Stone and Elizabeth Bowman， more than a thousand pages of manuscripts were prepared for lectures Sartre was to give in Rome and in the United States， but this material remains unpublished. This material is obviously necessary for a study of Sartre’s ethics， for it reflects what his dialectical ethics and the latest version of ethics would have become. As David Pellauer， the translator of Sartre’s Notebooks for an Ethics says， “anyone venturing to present ‘Sartre’s ethics’ must accept the possibility of being proved mistaken， at least until we have all of this material and whatever other writings may yet appear.”[9] As we have seen， Sartre never completely abandoned the theory of human freedom raised in his early works， but he did want to move from his theory of purely inpidual freedom to one of the free people living in the society. He wrote down many literatures to develop the dialectical ethics， but unfortunately we are unable to read all of them. This is the current situation that scholars who wish to examine Sartre’s ethical thoughts must confront with and accept. Based on this premise， to examine and retrieve Sartre’s ethics should first go through his ontology， in order to find the foundation on which his ethics is built upon. That is， the theory of freedom， which is the basis and the unifying thread of his ethics. Next， search for the essential issues of ethics he discussed in various places to find out the main ideas and distinctive points of his ethics. Moreover， pay more attention on ethical discussions after his radical conversion， because those are the points Sartre really wanted to expound as his neo-ethics. Having completed my inquiry into what Sartre has to say about ethics， we can get the answer whether there is finally a Sartrean ethics. Sartre indeed leaves us many significant and creative reflections on ethics， which are his obvious contribution to the theory of ethics. Even though he did not accomplish a systematic ethics， we cannot disregard what he brought about and say that there is no such a thing as Sartre’s ethics. The most significant points and characteristics of Sartean ethics， in my view， are as follows: Human freedom is the unifying thread of Sartre’s entire ethical theories. Sartre explains from ontology why and how man is originally free and how he sets freedom as his ultimate goal. This is because man is a being for-itself， he is a consciousness in nature， so that he is actually nothingness， contrasted to the things in the world-being in-itself， which itself is founded upon being about which we can only say that it is and is what it is. Since man lacks being， he constantly makes projects in order to transcend himself toward the in-itself. During the course of attempting to become a being in-itself-for-itself， man must deal with various choices. He is free to choose any one among many and he is responsible for what he does choose. Values and morality are brought forth in this process of choosing. Whatever he chooses， it not only makes moral value upsurge， but also is directed toward man’s ultimate end—the maximum freedom. All human activities are and for the matter of freedom. Freedom is the soul of Sartre’s ethics. Without it， Sartre’s ethics would not be established. Another important point is that Sartre emphasizes the power of man in morality. Sartre rejects all traditional views pertaining to a priori moral rules， human nature， and God’s role in relation to human behavior. He firmly and bravely states that there is no a priori morality， including a given nature and God， to control human activities. At the same time， he challenges the view that “if God is dead， everything is permitted.” He announces loudly that God provides us nothing in morality. He says， it is up to man， to human beings， to create morality. Man makes a decision by himself about what he should do， so it is man who makes things valuable， meaningful and therefore creates moral laws. Although Sartre’s view is fresh and new， it has caused many debates. Many tough questions have been raised regarding what Sartre says about values being the product of man’s freedom and his lack of being， such as if it is the case that every choice is valuable and moral， how to explain a choice of murdering? Obviously no one would think killing is just. In addition， if every choice is right， it would not be possible to weigh one thing as more valuable than another and to choose a better one. Moreover， if it were the case that all choices are moral， there would be no immorality. But if there is no immorality， what’s the necessity of ethics? Furthermore， if all value are derived from choices， how can we also show that freedom is the highest value since freedom is not derived from choices but it is a consequence of man’s mode of being which makes choosing possible. These questions are central to any evaluation of the adequacy of Sartre’s position regarding the subjectivity of all value judgments. If he cannot offer a reasonable answer to them， his point cannot stand. I have not been able to find anything that would indicate Sartre’s own response to these criticisms. Perhaps he did not anticipate such questions when he was formulating the basic framework of his ethics. Or maybe he was confident that he could respond to them， but he planned to do so in the volume on ethics that was never completed and never published. It might also be possible that he was unable to find a satisfactory answer and so chose to leave it as a problem for people after him to resolve， since it is evident from what we have seen that he never was willing to give up his early position concerning the proper understanding of human freedom. Therefore， we find here one crucial point for any further investigation into Sartre’s ethics. Either one must find a way to answer these difficult questions， it would seem， or one must begin again finding a way to revise Sartre’s analysis of freedom in such a way that such questions do not arise， or at least can be answered satisfactorily. The other significant contribution of Sartre in ethics is that he raises the issue of bad faith. As we often see， lying is frequently discussed in ethics. But what Sartre probes is a different issue. It is not the issue of lying to others; rather， it is the problem of self-deceit. Sartre made a profound research into such bad faith. He reveals that he nature of bad faith is to cover up one’s true being to others for one’s own purpose. The person in bad faith sets himself in a false imagination and regards it as reality. Although he knows clearly about what the actual reality is， he is not willing to recognize it. He would rather indulge his mind and body in illusions. Sartre shows us that bad faith is a very common phenomenon in human society. It is harmful to human freedom. Human freedom would be alienated and ruined if bad faith remains. To solve the problem of bad faith is possible， according to Sartre， however. Man can look for good faith. In other words， to be authentic. There are two ways to reach authenticity: to think lucidly and to be responsible. The former asks us not to elude reality. The latter tells us we must bravely deal with reality as we find it. These methods are perhaps still too general， some will say. Well， at least they provide some hints to us. Sartre did not have the chance to expound details of how he would apply these guidelines， although we can grasp something of how he understood them in his own concrete interventions in the events of his day， i.e.， to always try to be on the side of the oppressed. There are two great changes in Sartrean ethical view. One is that since he became more aware that man was a social being， human freedom must be studied in the context of its historical and social environment. He therefore set aside the idea and the method he adapted before that man was alone and could be understood in isolation from other people and his social conditions. As Sartre recognized his mistake， he found that man’s freedom was badly spoiled and alienated under the situation of oppression， poverty， and the class war. He thereby recognized that in order to restore an inpidual’s freedom， the oppressed had to unite and employ class force to seek social liberty first. Inpidual freedom could be seized back only of the whole oppressed class got liberated. This is a significant change. Before the end of the Second World War the method Sartre offered to treat bad faith was one of “self-recovery.” He believed that inpiduals could seek authenticity through a self-training in ethics. Yet after the war he totally gave up this view of the way to salvation. He turned his view to one where inpidual freedom could not truly exist unless freedom for all existed. The other important change is his theory of intersubjectivity. In the earlier time， Sartre had conceived that the relationship between inpiduals was always one of conflict， for one side is always going to objectify the other side. The picture of human relations drawn by Sartre was cruel and pessimistic. Nonetheless， when Sartre discovered man was social， he found reciprocity in human relations. The method he adapted was to think each person in a group as “a third.” In this way， everyone discovers that he is the “same” as others， for he can be a subject， an object， and the third person who watches others as a subject and as an object as well. And since there is no difference between each inpidual， everybody is equal to one anther. No one is ever a slave. It follows that there is a mutual recognition of freedom among different inpiduals. Sartre studied more closely the freedom in groups， in classes， and in nations in his well-known work， The Critique of Dialectical Reason. The result of his study of such mutual freedom for his ethics is the recognition that inpidual freedom has to be rooted in the soil of freedom for all. And inpidual freedom will be raised to a higher level when common freedom rises to a higher degree. But the result has a negative side， too. For it seems that the higher level common freedom develops to， the more restrictions land on inpidual freedom. This means that inpidual freedom will decrease when common freedom increases. So on the one hand， inpidual freedom cannot survive alone without common freedom; on the other hand， inpidual freedom is contradictory to common freedom to some extent. This is the dilemma the later Sartre confronted. On the one hand， we know that he still insisted on his early stand in favor of inpidual freedom; on the other hand， he came to understand that common freedom and social liberty are equally important. He has to find a way to integrate these two freedoms. It seems to me that Sartre did not solve this dilemma satisfactorily. That is why he hesitated to complete or to publish his work on ethics in his lifetime. Nevertheless， as Sartre said， it is good to leave a work unfinished and to leave room for readers to think about what might follow or what might have been. It is our task to try to finish Sartre’s ethics by trying to think beyond what he did say on the basis of what he did accomplish. Abstract: That is there a Sartre’s ethics is a heated debate in western philosophical society. This is because it’s true that Sartre made an announcement to write an ethical work right after his well known philosophical work ， but that work had never come into being. It is also true that Sartre wrote down many notebooks on ethics. And he had some unique and creative ethical thoughts spread in many of his discourses， essays， and philosophical works. From these facts， how do we conclude if Sartre really has his own ethical theory? This article introduces some different opining on this issue among western scholars and is going to present an answer to this question through an analysis. Key words: Sartre Ethics Earlier Ontology About Author: ji Ruman was teaching in the Philosophy Department of Fudan University from 1973 to 1985. She went to the USA to study western philosophy and obtained MA and PhD degrees in philosophy. She is a vice chairman of Basic Education Department in Shanghai Industrial and Commercial Foreign Language Institute at Present. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] Thomas C. Anderson: The Foundation and Structure of Sartrean Ethics， P.6. [2] Thomas W. Busch: The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstance in Sartre’s Philosophy， Bloomington: Indiana University Press， 1990， P.xi. [3] Ibid.， P.xiii. [4] David Detmer: Freedom as Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre， Lasalle， IL: Open Court， 1986， P. 2. [5] Simone de Beauvoir， Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre， trans， Patrick O’Brian (New York: Pantheon， 1984) 25. [6] Beauvoir， 21. [7] Beauvoir， 26. [8] 薩特：七十自述，出自生活/形勢(shì)，譯者：Paul Auster and Lydia Davis， 紐約：Pantheon， 1977， 第74-75頁。 [9] 薩特：倫理學(xué)筆記，譯者：David Pellauer， 芝加哥：芝加哥大學(xué)出版社，1992，第viii頁。 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] Thomas C. Anderson， The Foundation and Structure of Sartrean Ethics (The Regents Press of Kansas， 1979) 6. [2] Thomas W. Busch， The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstance in Sartre’s Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press， 1990) xi. [3] Busch xiii. [4] David Detmer， Freedom as Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre (Lasalle， IL: Open Court， 1986) 2. [5] Simone de Beauvoir， Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre， trans. Patrick O’Brian (New York: Pantheon， 1984) 25. [6] Beauvoir 21. [7] Beauvoir 26. [8] Sartre， “Self-Portrait at Seventy”， in Life/Situations ， trans. Paul Auster and Lydia Davis (New York: Pantheon， 1977) 74-75. [9] Sartre， Notebooks for an Ethics ， trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press， 1992) viii.